This is part of a mid-year AsianInvestor series on the investment outlook of fund managers with Asian equity portfolios.

Peter Elston is a Singapore-based strategist at Aberdeen Asset Management Asia, which he joined in 2008. He is responsible for articulating the fund house's macroeconomic research and the Asian team's investment strategy.

Aberdeen Asset Management manages more than $168 billion in assets worldwide, including around $45 billion in Asia.

What are the biggest opportunities that you see in the markets you are responsible for in the coming 12 months? How are you preparing to take advantage of those opportunities?

Peter Elston
Peter Elston
Elston: This economic downturn, like its predecessors, will serve to distinguish the strong companies from the weak. As Warren Buffett said, 'It's only when the tide goes out that you discover who's been swimming naked.' For much of this decade, poorly-managed companies were able hide behind strong economies and easy money. Now that economic growth is weak and banks are tightening lending standards, it has become harder for weaker companies to operate, and this trend will only continue. So the big opportunity for us in the coming 12 months is to confirm that our holdings are those that are able to see this downturn as an opportunity and to strengthen their competitive positions at the expense of weaker rivals. The next 20 years will be very different from the last 20, and companies that are not able to adapt will struggle. This presents huge investment opportunities for bottom up investors.

How different or similar is your 12-month investment outlook now compared to the start of this year?

It is very hard to predict how equities will perform over the next 12 months, particularly following such a strong rally. We are still in a period of economic turbulence, in which conditions in the short- to medium-term may either improve or deteriorate unpredictably. That said, we are now able to envisage, at least conceptually, a world in which Asian economies are able to grow again even if those in the developed world continue to struggle. While the collapse in Western demand for Asia's exports has left a big hole in the region's economies, balance sheets at government, corporate and personal levels are generally in good shape and thus constitute a solid base on which new growth can be built.

Have you made any significant changes to your asset allocation in terms of markets or sectors in the past few months?

We do not operate an active asset allocation strategy. Our country and sector weights result passively from our bottom-up stock picks, though we do check that we do not end up taking excessive risk in a particular country or industry.

Our process is one that favours steady companies with sound financials, and so our portfolios entered the crisis in good shape relative to a market portfolio that included highly geared companies. Although we have always run focused portfolios, believing that diversification beyond a certain point is unnecessary if you know your companies very well, we have further reduced the number of holdings in our regional model over the last year or so to 45 from more than 50. Stocks that have been removed from the model are those which, for a variety of reasons, we felt may not weather the crisis well. We are confident that the vast majority of our holdings are companies which will emerge from the crisis stronger relative to their rivals.

What are the greatest lessons you have learned from the global financial crisis and how will this affect the way you manage your portfolios?

There are very few who can honestly say that the global financial crisis has played out the way they thought it would. Indeed, we are not among them. For us, what we came to appreciate as the crisis unfolded was the extent to which revenues of companies around the world had, directly or indirectly, been driven by credit-fuelled consumption for a very long time. The high economic growth the world had experienced since the early-80s was therefore clearly unsustainable, and the crisis has been the period in which the world moves, painfully, to a new growth model. Although it is not yet clear what this model will look like, it will almost certainly be one in which bank credit plays a lesser role.

How has your view of Asian equities changed since the start of 2009 when investor sentiment was generally gloomier?

Although we had no idea at the end of 2008 where Asian equities were headed, we had started to see a lot of value emerging in our portfolios. Asian equities had reached around 1.3 times book value, which is cheap both in absolute terms and relative to its historical range.

How has the swine flu affected your investments?

During the days when fears over swine flu were surfacing, holdings such as Singapore Airlines and Café de Coral underperformed a little. However, since it now appears that the illness may not be as serious as first thought, these stocks have recovered.

What are your market weightings within an Asia ex-Japan equities portfolio?

Our model portfolio weightings are:

China - 6.5%
Hong Kong - 21.2%
India - 15.1%
Indonesia - 1.8%
Korea - 6.6%
Malaysia - 5.2%
Pakistan - 0%
Philippines - 2.5%
Singapore - 21.3%
Sri Lanka - 0%
Taiwan - 5.3%
Thailand - 4.4%
Vietnam - 0%

What are your favoured markets in Asia?

We prefer markets, such as Singapore and Hong Kong, where there is a decent level of investor protection in place. If the PCCW fiasco, for example, had happened in a less developed country in Asia, the privatisation may well not have been overturned by the courts. We were not holders of PCCW but were comforted by the SFC's (Hong Kong's Securities & Futures Commission) strong opposition to the deal.

What are the markets you are going to steer clear of in the next 12 months?

For the same reasons as with our preferred markets, we tend to avoid or underweight those where investor protection or corporate governance standards are weak. We therefore find it very hard to feel comfortable investing our clients' money in Korea, China and Taiwan. There are exceptions, of course, and these are where we find the investment opportunities, but they remain limited. The Chinese banks are a good example of an industry which is not being run for the benefit of minority shareholders but for the benefit of its majority shareholder, the state. State-directed lending on the scale we are seeing at the moment may boost profits in the medium term, but we would be very cautious about non-performing loans a few years from now.

Which sectors do you expect to outperform in the next 12 months?

We think that demand from the West for Asia's exports will be stagnant for perhaps a number of years, as consumers in developed countries in Europe and the US rebuild savings. So, broadly speaking, we prefer companies in domestic-related sectors. But this does not mean that companies that are perceived as exporters cannot find new markets within Asia.

Which sectors do you expect to underperform?

We do not have particularly strong views on which sectors will underperform in the next 12 months. Our biggest underweight relative to the MSCI regional index is in the materials sector. Broadly speaking, the materials sector is one where there is no brand value, a factor that can produce sustainable excess returns on capital. While there may be periods of up to three years when the materials sector is reaping good profits and the shares of companies are performing well, we think that it is an industry in which competition soon neutralises excess profit and so one that does not tend to offer good long-term investment opportunities.

What are the main challenges that you expect to face in the coming 12 months?

From a business perspective, our greatest challenge is to emerge from this crisis stronger, relative to our competition. We think broadly that there has been a failure by the investment industry to deliver on its promises. In extreme cases, there is the Madoff fraud or losses relating to certain money market funds and guaranteed products. More generally, many funds promising positive returns in all market conditions have failed to achieve their objective recently. There is also a whole universe of structured products whose risks, and costs, were not fully understood by investors. What we have always promised our investors is, through thorough, in-house research, to find strong, well-managed companies with the aim of owning them for a long time. The simple principle behind this approach is that it should, over periods of five to 10 years, produce returns in excess of both risk-free rates, as well as market averages. Indeed, we have delivered on this promise in Asia. But the last 24 months have shaken investors' confidence in a buy-and-hold approach to a degree, and our challenge is to try to restore this lost confidence, to remind our audience that investing is about buying great companies, and aligning one's investment time horizon with theirs.

The fact is that we have just witnessed a once-in-a-century event in terms of market performance, and while we may still be in a bear market, now is not the time to run away from a buy-and-hold approach but to embrace it. Indeed, market falls over the last two years have served to highlight the strength of our approach relative to our peers. However, paradoxically, the best time to invest is often the most challenging time to market a research-driven, buy-and-hold approach. But following this crisis the world of the future will be very different to that of the last 30 years, and there will be an abundance of interesting long-term investment opportunities, particularly in Asia.

What are the main risks of investing in Asia at the moment? How are you managing those risks? 

The important risk for our clients is the risk of permanent loss of capital so market volatility over the next two to three years does not concern us. Risks that would result in permanent loss of capital relate to company specific situations such as the accounting fraud at Satyam, derivatives losses at Citic Pacific, or Gome Electrical Appliance's chairman being investigated for 'economic crimes'. Aside from our process, which has a good track record of weeding out badly-managed companies, the best way to control other company specific risks is through having an optimal level of concentration, in which one is not overly exposed to a particular company.